DAO Governance Proposal: Implementation of a Postponement Fail-Safe for Whitelist Proposals
Aquarius DAO proposes a postponement fail-safe for whitelist governance: if a whitelisted asset suffers external exploitation after a bond is posted, proposal creators can pause voting at zero cost to resume later, or forfeit the bond to DAO treasury. The mechanism incentivizes asset recovery over abandonment.
Aquarius DAO proposes a postponement fail-safe mechanism for whitelist governance to protect proposal creators when externally exploited assets post governance bonds. If a whitelisted asset suffers a third-party hack after bonding but before or during voting, the creator currently loses capital with no option to pause. The proposal introduces two pathways: (1) Postponement at zero cost if external exploitation is verified, allowing the creator to resume voting later once the asset is stabilized, or (2) Cancellation with bond forfeiture to DAO treasury. The mechanism uses strict verification to prevent governance gaming, incentivizes recovery of compromised protocols rather than abandonment, and clears dead proposals from the registry. The case study is BLND, a Blend Capital asset and high-TVL pool that was hacked while its whitelist proposal was active.