Implement Exponential Boost Dampening for Bribed Markets
Aquarius proposal #106 introduces exponential boost dampening to prevent markets from exploiting combined bribes and vote boosts. Non-strategic markets will see voting multipliers decay as bribes increase, while core AQUA/XLM, AQUA/USDC, and XLM/USDC pairs retain full boosts.
The proposal addresses a governance vulnerability where actors stack bribes with vote boosts (up to 1.8× multiplier) to disproportionately capture AQUA rewards without genuine market participation. Proposal #106 introduces a non-linear dampening curve that reduces voting multipliers as bribe amounts increase. Core ecosystem pairs—AQUA/XLM, AQUA/USDC, XLM/USDC—are exempt, retaining full additive boosts for liquidity stability. Non-strategic markets with single boosts will see multipliers decay toward 1.0× as bribes approach market cap limits. The formula is dynamic, allowing future parameter adjustments via governance without contract changes. The design preserves bribe market participation while preventing reward concentration and circular extraction loops.
